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Letter dated 2 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I transmit herewith two documents detailing the infringements of international air traffic regulations and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey (see annex I) and the illegal use of closed ports by Turkish warships (see annex II) during the month of August 2017. It should also be noted that Turkish commercial aircraft systematically use the illegal airport of Tympou.

Furthermore, I wish to inform you that the occupation regime illegally issued two notices to airmen relating to exercises conducted by the Turkish Air Force during August 2017.

Turkey's actions clearly aim at undermining the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, bolstering the continuing de facto division and upgrading the secessionist entity's status, by claiming a purported airspace over the occupied territory of the Republic. In addition, Turkey continues to systematically harass civilian and military aircraft within the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) via radio calls. Meanwhile, Nicosia FIR infringements of regulations and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus continue unabated. Turkey's policy of persistently breaching international law and defying international rules and regulations puts the safety of international civil aviation at risk, has a negative impact on the stability of the region and causes difficulties for air traffic over Cyprus.

It should further be underlined that the continuation of Turkey's illegal actions created tension during a critical period for the successful outcome of the ongoing negotiation process for a peaceful comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem.

On behalf of my Government, I strongly protest against the continuing infringements of international air traffic regulations and the violations of the national airspace and the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey and appeal for their immediate cessation. The Republic of Cyprus reiterates, in this respect, its call for adherence to the principle of sovereignty and non-interference enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

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I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annexes as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kornelios **Korneliou**

Annex I to the letter dated 2 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Airborne violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
2 August	0943-1110	One UH-1 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia area control centre (ACC).
	1102-1122	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1155-1220	One PC-12 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1600-1727	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1621-1719	Two F-16 and two F-4E Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1641-1657	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1654-1714	One PC-12 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1657-1731	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1756-2035	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
3 August	1110-1222	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	2103-2228	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
4 August	1020-1310	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
7 August	0937-1201	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1505-1540	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
8 August	0842-1442	Two Cougar Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1001-1133	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
15 August	1728-1818	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1947-2104	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
16 August	1146-1208	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1707-1725	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
17 August	0936-1157	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1038-1125	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
20 August	1214-1312	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
21 August	1124-1148	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
22 August	0620-0940	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0928-1000	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0930-1036	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0945-1239	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1622-1724	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1624-1711	Two F-4 and four F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1658-1719	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
23 August	0615-0940	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
24 August	0602-0818	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
25 August	1050-1110	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
28 August	0935-0951	One Gulfstream Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1908-2030	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1916-1940	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
29 August	1020-1137	Two Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	2345-2353	One Gulfstream Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Annex II to the letter dated 2 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Naval violations

Dates	*Nature of violation*
1-4 August	One P-332 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
4-6 August	One P-332 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
8-11 August	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
11-16 August	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
17-18 August	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
18-21 August	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
21-23 August	One P-332 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
22-23 August	One A-1600 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
23-25 August	One P-332 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
25-30 August	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.

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Letter dated 3 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I am communicating with you to convey our grave concern regarding the alarming deterioration of the human rights situation in Turkey and the direct impact of this anomalous situation in the areas of the Republic of Cyprus currently occupied militarily by Turkey. More than a year after the attempted coup in Turkey, the state of emergency is still in force and the measures enacted and enforced through the emergency decrees have often been excessive and disproportionate, with grave and far-reaching negative consequences for Turkish society.

Various international bodies and States have voiced their concerns about the further erosion of the democratic institutions in Turkey, the adoption of authoritarian policies and the continuous violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the silencing of dissident voices and of any form of criticism against the Turkish Government and AKP. Cyprus, however, has additional reasons to be worried about these negative developments in Turkey, as these have a direct impact on the everyday life of a significant number of Cypriot citizens who live under Turkey's full political, military, administrative and economic control in the areas of Cyprus presently occupied by it.

The Turkish Government has been extending to the occupied areas of Cyprus its purges of persons allegedly linked to a "terrorist organization", meaning the Fettulah Gülen movement, by proceeding with arresting people on the basis of a list.

The information about the extension of the purges to the occupied part of Cyprus cannot be disassociated from a wider methodical attempt by the Turkish Government to impose a political, economic and social agenda in the occupied areas along the lines of similar policies in Turkey. In this connection, we have witnessed, lately, an intensification of Turkish attempts to change the demographics of the occupied areas of Cyprus through colonization and a "citizenship" granting process for Turkish citizens. Illegal Turkish settlers, brought to Cyprus from Anatolia, consciously or unconsciously assume the role of a catalyst for the advancement and implementation of AKP policies intended to further integrate the Turkish Cypriot

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community into Turkey and to "Turkify" the occupied areas of Cyprus, with far-reaching repercussions in the Government-controlled areas of the Republic.

Since AKP rose to power in Turkey, the Turkish Government has been implementing, in the occupied part of Cyprus, a systematic policy of empowering religiousness in the daily life of the Turkish Cypriots, a practice which obtrudes on their distinct cultural and secular identity. This policy is pursued largely through education. Within a short period of time, various religious educational institutions and religious schools began operating in the occupied part of Cyprus with the economic support of Turkey. In 2009, religion was introduced as a compulsory course in public education, despite reactions from educators. Recently adopted controversial reforms in the Turkish education system are expected to be integrated into the school curricula in the occupied areas. Similarly, the Turkish Cypriot academy for teachers will soon be abolished on the basis of a so-called "protocol" signed between Turkey and the secessionist entity in the occupied areas, thus putting an end to a long tradition in the education of the Turkish Cypriot community. Moreover, the Turkish Ministry of Youth and Sports has established in the occupied areas of Cyprus an "Oversea Coordination Office", aiming at enforcing, organizing and managing all sports and youth events and programmes. Notwithstanding the open, and in some cases intense, reaction from organized groups in the Turkish Cypriot community, the aforesaid changes seem to be permanent, while any serious criticism of religion-related policies is liable to be denounced as a lack of faith in, or malevolent opposition to, the Turkish Government.

The full economic dependency of the Turkish Cypriot community on Turkey constitutes yet another significant parameter of Turkey's plan to dominate and fully control every single aspect of life in the occupied areas. The Turkish political institutions operating in the occupied areas, headed by the so-called "Turkish Embassy", in collaboration with business and economic circles close to the Turkish Government, have been pursuing an agenda of fully subordinating to Turkey the economic activities and development of the Turkish Cypriots. The framework of this policy is clearly defined by the so-called "economic protocols" signed between Turkey and the secessionist entity, as well as by a series of other "agreements" dictating Turkey's terms over the Turkish Cypriots. The most indicative example of Turkey's evident imposition of full control over the occupied areas is the illegal water connection of the aforesaid areas, through a subsea water pipeline, with Turkey. Turkey not only holds ownership of the water and of the relevant installations, but also dictates the terms of its management and monopoly in its own interest. According to Turkish officials, a similar "agreement" is on track regarding an electricity connection between Turkey and the occupied areas.

The impact of Turkey's policies in the Turkish Cypriot community is direct, visible and felt by everybody. The most striking example, of immense symbolism, is the enforced application, in the occupied area, of the Turkish time zone, which results in the absurdity of two time zones being operative simultaneously on the same small island. Undeterred by massive protests, Turkey has imposed its policy for two years in a row, thereby consolidating the division of Cyprus also in terms of time regulation.

The future of the Turkish Cypriots, as one of the two Cypriot communities, is inextricably linked to the future of all Cypriots and of the whole of Cyprus. This is why my Government follows closely the alarming developments in the occupied areas and reiterates its expression of grave concern for the predicament afflicting part of the people of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot community. Their identity and future seem to be in serious jeopardy as a result of Turkey's assimilation polices,

especially in view of their extremely limited ability, under the present conditions, to react, disagree or criticize.

It is the expectation of the Government of Cyprus that the international community will demonstrate the same concern for the human rights situation and the security of Cypriot citizens in the occupied part of Cyprus as it has for the Turkish citizens in Turkey.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kornelios **Korneliou**

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Seventy-second year

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Elimination of racism and racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance

Promotion and protection of human rights

The rule of law at the national and international levels

Letter dated 3 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In connection with the letter from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Armenia to the United Nations (A/71/1030-S/2017/727), I would like to draw your attention to the following issues.

It is a well-established fact that Armenia used military force to seize a part of the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan, including the Nagorno-Karabakh region, the seven adjacent districts and some exclaves, and to set up the subordinate separatist regime there.

The war waged by Armenia claimed the lives of tens of thousands of people, ruined cities and livelihoods and resulted in the forcible expulsion of more than 1 million Azerbaijanis from their homes and properties, while thousands of people went missing in connection with the conflict. The most serious crimes of concern to the international community, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and ethnic cleansing, have been committed by the Armenian forces in the course of the aggression.

In contrast to Armenia's assertions and notwithstanding the various papers it circulates in the United Nations and other international organizations on behalf of the puppet regime it has set up in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, which are null and void ab initio, the illegality of that regime has been repeatedly stated at the international level in the most unambiguous manner. Below are some examples.

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In its resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993), the Security Council condemned the use of force against Azerbaijan and the bombardment and occupation of its territories and reaffirmed respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory. In response to Armenia's territorial claims and forcible actions, the Council reconfirmed that the Nagorno-Karabakh region is an integral part of Azerbaijan and demanded the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of the occupying forces from all the occupied territories.

In the resolutions, the Security Council acknowledged the fact that acts of military force were committed against Azerbaijan; that such actions are unlawful and incompatible with the prohibition of the use of armed force in international relations and in contradiction with the Charter of the United Nations and its purposes; and that they constitute an obvious violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.

It is important to note that the Security Council adopted its resolutions after the Armenian inhabitants of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan had unilaterally declared "independence", thus making it absolutely clear that said declaration had no legal effect whatsoever.

The numerous documents adopted by other authoritative international organizations are framed along the same lines.

Armenia's persistent denial of its responsibility for the aggression against Azerbaijan and unlawful occupation of and military presence in my country's territory has been effectively put to an end by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in its landmark judgment (Merits) of 16 June 2015 in the case of *Chiragov and others v. Armenia*. The Court ruled in favour of the applicants, who are the six Azerbaijani nationals forcibly displaced from the occupied Lachyn district of Azerbaijan, recognizing continuing violations by Armenia of a number of their rights under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

Having examined the evidence presented, the Court, inter alia, came to the following conclusions:

- "The Republic of Armenia, through its military presence and the provision of military equipment and expertise, has been significantly involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from an early date";
- "This military support has been — and continues to be — decisive for the conquest of and continued control over the territories in issue";
- The separatist regime in those territories "survives by virtue of the military, political, financial and other support given to it by Armenia which, consequently, exercises effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories...".[1]

The Court also confirmed its conclusion from the admissibility decision of 14 December 2011, according to which the separatist entity "is not recognized as a State under international law by any countries or international organisations..." and, "against this background, the invoked laws cannot be considered legally valid for the

[1] *Chiragov and others v. Armenia*, Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, Judgment (Merits) of 16 June 2015, application No. 13216/05, paras. 180, 183, 185, 186.

purposes of the Convention and the applicants cannot be deemed to have lost their alleged rights to the land in question by virtue of these laws...".[2]

Consequently, the separatist regime established by Armenia in the occupied territory of Azerbaijan is ultimately nothing other than the product of aggression, racial discrimination and ethnic cleansing; the regime is under the direction and control of Armenia.

Regarding the attempts of Armenia to change the geographic name of a part of Azerbaijan's internationally recognized territory, their invalidity stems from a clear violation of international law, the Constitution and the legislation of Azerbaijan and the principles and procedures for international standardization of geographical names established within the United Nations.

In reality, by propagating the existence of a puppet separatist regime, Armenia denies the facts and patently demonstrates its total disregard for the position of the international community and its unwillingness to comply with the generally accepted norms and principles of international law.

Armenia's allegation of the existence of a "strategy of Azerbaijan aimed at expelling the indigenous population of Artsakh from its ancestral homeland" represents another falsehood. There is a solid body of documented evidence that easily refutes this fake narrative.

The facts show that the Armenians appeared in what they call their "ancestral homeland" only in the nineteenth century. Their subsequent mass resettlement in the South Caucasus and attempts at territorial expansion have laid the basis for long-term instability, tensions and conflicts in the region that continue to date and have been accompanied by massacres and forcible deportations of the Azerbaijani population.[3]

Suffice it to mention that, over the 70 years of Soviet rule, the territory of Armenia has increased from 8,000-10,000 km^2 to 29,800 km^2.[4] This was achieved as a result of political manipulations aimed at altering the demographic and territorial structure that existed at that time, the consequences of which were the inclusion, in 1920, of the western part of the Zangazur region of Azerbaijan in Armenia, thus cutting off the Nakhchyvan region of Azerbaijan from the rest of the country.

Moreover, although the mountainous part of Karabakh was given the status of autonomous oblast in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan SSR) in July 1923, its administrative boundaries were defined in such a way as to carve out the Azerbaijani villages and artificially create a new demographic composition in the region. At the same time, a population of more than half-a-million Azerbaijanis compactly residing at that period in Armenia has not only been refused the same privilege, but has been forced in the years since to leave their homelands there.

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[2] Ibid., paras. 148 and 182.

[3] See the report entitled *The Armed Aggression of the Republic of Armenia against the Republic of Azerbaijan: Root Causes and Consequences* (A/64/475-S/2009/508), and the "Commentary to the remarks made by President Serzh Sargsyan of the Republic of Armenia at the Third International Forum of Moscow State Institute of International Relations Alumni", held on 23 October 2015 in Yerevan, Armenia. Available from www.mfa.gov.az/files/file/MFA_Commentary_to_the_remarks_by_Serzh_Sargsyan.pdf.

[4] See, for example, G. Galoyan, *Struggle for the Soviet Rule in Armenia* (Moscow, State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1957); S. P. Agayan, *Great October and Struggle of Labours in Armenia for the Victory of the Soviet Rule* (Yerevan, Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian SSR, 1962); E. C. Sarcissian, *Expansionary Policy of the Ottoman Empire in Transcaucasia on the Eve and in the Years of the First World War* (Yerevan, Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian SSR, 1962); *History of the Armenian People* (Yerevan, Yerevan University Press, 1980).

Despite the fact that the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous oblast of the Azerbaijan SSR possessed all essential elements of self-government, nationalistic circles in Armenia and their outside ideologists have never given up the idea of further territorial expansionism. As a result, at the end of 1987, the Armenia SSR openly laid claim to the territory of the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous oblast of Azerbaijan and soon after resorted to terrorist and armed activities that led to a large-scale war with devastating consequences.

Armenia's speculations about the human rights of the ethnic group residing in the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan are nothing but another futile effort to cover up its annexationist policy, to create a wrong impression of the real situation on the ground and to deflect the attention of the international community from the urgent need to address the main problems caused by the continuing aggression against Azerbaijan and the resulting military occupation of its territories.

By its preposterous interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international human rights treaties, Armenia not only demonstrates unfamiliarity with their drafting history, but also with their object and purpose, as well as the letter and spirit of those documents.

None of the commitments on human rights protection constitute preferential treatment for any State, group or person, or may be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any activity or perform any action in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and other obligations under international law, including particularly those relating to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States. All human rights instruments contain the special provisions against politically motivated misinterpretations, such as those resorted to by Armenia.

It is worth recalling article 29 (3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which specifically notes that "these rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations". Article 30 of the Universal Declaration is even more unequivocal in stressing that "nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein".

Common article 1.2 of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights focuses on "the principle of mutual benefit and international law", while common article 5.1 of both Covenants stipulates that "nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights or freedoms recognized herein, or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant". According to articles 24 and 25 of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights and articles 46 and 47 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, "nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations..." and "... the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources".

By quoting article 9 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, Armenia omits to mention that the same document reaffirms, among the fundamental principles governing inter-State economic relations, the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and sovereign equality of all States, non-aggression and non-intervention. The Charter also stresses, in article 2, that "every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and economic activities". In article 16, the Charter

emphasizes that "it is the right and duty of all States, individually and collectively, to eliminate colonialism, apartheid, racial discrimination, neo-colonialism and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation and domination, and the economic and social consequences thereof, as a prerequisite for development". The same article also states that "no State has the right to promote or encourage investments that may constitute an obstacle to the liberation of a territory occupied by force" (see General Assembly resolution 3281 (XXIX), articles 12 and 16).

The Declaration on the Right to Development, to which Armenia also refers, considers in particular "that the elimination of the massive and flagrant violations of the human rights of the peoples and individuals affected by situations such as those resulting from colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid, all forms of racism and racial discrimination, foreign domination and occupation, aggression and threats against national sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity and threats of war would contribute to the establishment of circumstances propitious to the development of a great part of mankind" and recalls the obligations of States in that regard. The Declaration also points out, in article 3 (2), that "the realization of the right to development requires full respect for the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations".[5]

It is no coincidence that, by recalling selectively the relevant provisions of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (article 9) and the Declaration on the Right to Development (article 3), which emphasize the obligations of States to cooperate with each other in various fields, Armenia fails to provide a single piece of evidence of the existence of any successful example of such cooperation, of which one is an aggressor and the other is the object of the aggression. It would be nonsense for a country whose territory is under military occupation, whose hundreds of thousands of citizens were subjected to atrocious crimes and notorious ethnic cleansing, to provide the aggressor access to its territory and engage with it in any economic and trade relations.

To summarize, the aforementioned documents make it absolutely clear that no right can be exercised at the expense of the violation of the rights of others; that States have and shall exercise full sovereignty over their wealth, natural resources and economic activities; and that cooperation with a view to ensuring development is possible when the situations that emerged as a result of flagrant violations of international law, such as racism and racial discrimination, foreign domination and occupation, aggression and threats against national sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity, are eliminated.

Furthermore, human rights and fundamental freedoms are universal, embrace all humanity, and respect for these rights must be accorded on an equal and non-discriminatory basis. As reaffirmed in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action in 1993, "all human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis" (see A/CONF.157/24 (Part I), chap. III, para. 5).

In contrast, having implemented a "scorched earth policy", qualified as unacceptable and vigorously condemned by the Organization (then Conference) for Security and Cooperation in Europe,[6] Armenia now refuses even to accept the existence of the Azerbaijani community of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan.

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[5] General Assembly resolution 41/128, ninth paragraph of the preamble; and articles 3 (2) and 5.

[6] CSCE Communication No. 301, Prague, 19 November 1993.

Against that background, Armenia's frequent speculations on confidence-building measures represent yet another mean in its futile efforts to mislead the international community. Evidently, Armenia's perception of such measures is limited to those that would only consolidate and prolong the occupation of the territories of Azerbaijan. References by Armenia to confidence-building are also curious insofar as Armenia persistently opposes direct contact between the Azerbaijani and Armenian communities of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan.

It is apparent that Armenia's policy and practices are based on exclusion and discrimination on ethnic grounds and are aimed at legitimization of the results of the unlawful use of force and ethnic cleansing.

It gives rise to the obvious conclusion that Armenia cannot demand privileges at the very core of which are gross and systematic violations of international law, including international humanitarian and human rights law, and the discriminatory denial of fundamental rights and freedoms with respect to others, in particular the significantly larger Azerbaijani population that was expelled and prevented from returning to their homes and properties in both Armenia and the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

Armenia and its affiliates in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan are responsible for internationally wrongful acts, several of which constitute serious breaches of obligations arising from peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens). These include, most notably: (a) the use of force in order to impose the de facto secession of the Nagorno-Karabakh region and the other districts of Azerbaijan occupied by Armenia in violation of the Charter of the United Nations; (b) the ensuing violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan; (c) the ethnic cleansing of the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, including the establishment of settlements and the implantation of ethnic Armenian settlers with a view to changing the demographic composition of those territories; (d) the gross violation of the laws and customs of war; (e) the exploitation of the natural resources of the occupied territories without consideration for the primacy of the interests of the population (as it existed before the ethnic cleansing of the region); and (f) the alteration of the cultural heritage of the region.[7]

Armenia's responsibility, which is incurred by its internationally wrongful acts, involves legal consequences manifested in the obligation to cease these acts, to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees that they will not recur and to provide full reparation for injury.[8]

As long as Armenia's internationally wrongful acts continue, Azerbaijan is entitled to react by exercising its inherent right of self-defence, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and international law,[9] as well as by taking non-forcible countermeasures in order to procure the cessation of such acts and to achieve reparation for the injury.[10]

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[7] See, for example, Alain Pellet, *Legal opinion on third party obligations with respect to illegal economic and other activities in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan* (A/71/880-S/2017/316, annex); Malcolm N. Shaw, *Report on the international legal responsibilities of Armenia as the belligerent occupier of Azerbaijani territory* (A/63/692-S/2009/51, annex); and Malcolm N. Shaw, *Report on the international legal rights of the Azerbaijani internally displaced persons and the Republic of Armenia's responsibility* (A/66/787-S/2012/289, annex).

[8] James Crawford, *The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002), arts. 28-39.

[9] See A/63/662-S/2008/812; and Crawford, *The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility*.

[10] Crawford, *The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility*.

It is unequivocally clear that countermeasures undertaken by Azerbaijan in order to ensure the safety of its citizens and protect their rights, defend the State's sovereignty and restore the situation of legality are in full accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

Moreover, serious breaches by Armenia of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law give rise to additional consequences, which include, inter alia, duties of States to cooperate in order to bring to an end a serious breach by lawful means, not to recognize as lawful a situation created by such breach, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.[11] The maxim *ex injuria ius non oritur* provides the basis for the obligation of non-recognition; that is, a legal right cannot stem from an unlawful act. As territory cannot be acquired by the unlawful use of force, States are obliged to not give legal credence — recognition of authority over the territory — to the unlawful acquisition.[12] It is, at a minimum, intended to prevent "the validation of an unlawful situation by seeking to ensure that a fait accompli resulting from serious illegalities do not consolidate and crystallize over time into situations recognized by the international legal order".[13]

As a firmly established specific technique for dealing with illegal regimes, the duty of collective non-recognition and abstention from aid or assistance that contributes to the consolidation of the illegal situation have been applied in connection with the unlawful acts of Armenia. As noted above, the Security Council and other international political and judicial institutions have invalidated the separatist regime, established by Armenia in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, and thus resolutely prevented, once and for all, crystallization of claims by Armenia over those territories. Furthermore, not only Azerbaijan, but also a number of other States Members of the United Nations, in their efforts to limit the consequences of gross violations of international law by Armenia, refrain from either establishing diplomatic or consular relations with Armenia or minimizing them, as well as from entering into economic and trade cooperation with it.

In that regard, Armenia's mention of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)* merits particular attention.

In the opinion, the International Court held that the presence of South Africa in the mandated territory, following the revocation of the mandate, was illegal, and then went on to consider the legal effects for States of the illegality. The Court attributed substantial legal content to the duty of non-recognition, stating in that connection that the States Members of the United Nations are "under obligation to recognize the illegality and invalidity of South Africa's continued presence in Namibia" and to refrain "from lending any support or any form of assistance to South Africa with reference to its occupation of Namibia".[14]

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[11] Ibid., arts. 40-41; and General Assembly resolution 62/243, operative para. 5.

[12] See James Crawford, "Opinion on third party obligations with respect to Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories" (2012). Available from www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/tucfiles/LegalOpinionIsraeliSettlements.pdf, para. 46.

[13] See Martin Dawidowicz, "The obligation of non-recognition of an unlawful situation, in James Crawford, Alain Pellet and Simon Olleson, eds., *The Law of International Responsibility* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010).

[14] *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971*, paras. 118-119; see also, James Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006).

To summarize, according to the Court, non-recognition implied abstention from treaty relations concerning Namibia; cessation of "active intergovernmental co-operation" under existing bilateral treaties relating to Namibia; abstention from all diplomatic or consular activity in Namibia, and, notably, abstention from "economic and other forms of relationship or dealing with South Africa on behalf or concerning Namibia which may entrench its authority over the Territory".[15]

By mentioning the *Namibia* Opinion, Armenia actually admits that the aforementioned conclusion of the International Court in that case is applicable by analogy to its own policy and practices with regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh region and other occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Thus, Armenia confesses that its presence in the territories of Azerbaijan is illegal; that its actions are in violation of international law and must entail the special consequences, namely: the non-recognition of the illegal situation; the prohibition of aid or assistance in maintaining it; and the responsibility of the world community to ensure strict compliance by Armenia with its international obligations.

In its *Namibia* opinion, the International Court also introduced an element of flexibility in the doctrine of non-recognition, by stating that:

> "In general, the non-recognition of South Africa's administration of the Territory should not result in depriving the people of Namibia of any advantages derived from international co-operation. In particular, while official acts performed by the Government of South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termination of the Mandate are illegal and invalid, this invalidity cannot be extended to those acts, such as, for instance, the registration of births, deaths and marriages, the effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the inhabitants of the Territory".[16]

Attempts by Armenia to whitewash its annexationist policy and illegal actions by misinterpreting this specific opinion of the Court are groundless. Suffice it to recall some authoritative views in that regard.

Thus, one of the Court's judges on the case noted, in particular, that "other States should not regard as valid any acts and transactions of the authorities in Namibia relating to public property, concessions, etc".[17]

James Crawford clarified that "the obligation [of non-recognition] has an inherent flexibility that will permit (or, at least, not expressly prohibit) the acceptance of acts which do not purport to secure or enhance territorial claims, but which as a result of their commercial, minor administrative or 'routine' character, or which are of immediate benefit to the population, should be regarded as 'untainted by the illegality of the administration'". He further adds that "[examples] of such "untainted" acts could include the registration of a birth or the sale of milk from a local settlement store...".[18]

According to James G. Stewart, "attempts by the then South African government to grant title in Namibian natural resources were 'illegal and invalid,' since the expropriation of natural resources could hardly be reconciled with the humanitarian

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[15] *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)*, para. 124.

[16] Ibid., para. 125; see also, Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law*.

[17] *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)* (Separate opinion of Judge De Castro).

[18] Crawford, "Opinion on third party obligations with respect to Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories", para. 51. Available from www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/tucfiles/LegalOpinionIsraeli Settlements.pdf. .

exceptions to the general rule — expropriating natural resources is not analogous with registering births, deaths, and marriages".[19]

Indeed, it is hard to imagine that, by mentioning the specific humanitarian exceptions with regard to a particular situation under its advisory proceeding, such as the registration of births, deaths and marriages, the International Court had in mind unlimited trade and economic activities of all the occupants throughout the world, at the core of which would be their own economic benefit from the exploitation of resources and other wealth in the occupied territories.

It is well established that the illegal economic and other activities in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan have turned into a lucrative business and are one of the sources of income for Armenia and the puppet regime it has set up in those territories. Armenia is seeking to prolong the occupation in order to retain control over mineral, agricultural and water resources in those territories and expropriates their wealth for its own economic benefit.[20]

Above all, attempts to change the demographic composition of the occupied territories of Azerbaijan existed before the outbreak of the conflict by artificially increasing the number of Armenians there and preventing the return to their homes and properties of hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijani internally displaced persons, along with the destruction and appropriation of property, the exploitation and pillage of natural resources and other wealth in the occupied territories can in no way be humanitarian in nature and consistent with human rights standards.

The total disruption of all relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, including economic, transport and energy links, is a direct consequence of Armenia's continuing military occupation of the territories of Azerbaijan. Obviously, with its policy of aggression and territorial claims towards its neighbours, Armenia bears sole responsibility for isolating itself from full-fledged regional cooperation and for the current dire economic situation facing the country and miserable conditions of life in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

The Security Council, in its resolutions 853 (1993), paragraphs 3 to 5, and 874 (1993), paragraph 5, clearly made the removal of all obstacles to communications and transportation conditional upon the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of the Armenian occupying forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

In fact, the Armenian side, including at the highest political level, has also accepted that settlement of the conflict and respect for international law are the necessary preconditions for enabling economic cooperation. Thus, for example, in the joint declaration signed by the Presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation on 2 November 2008, at Meiendorf Castle, the Russian Federation, inter alia, states that signatories will work towards a political settlement of the conflict on the basis of the principles and norms of international law and the resolutions and documents adopted in this framework, which will create favourable conditions for economic development and all-encompassing cooperation in the region.

International economic relations are governed by the fundamental principles of sovereign equality of States, non-aggression and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States. Peace and good neighbourly relations, based on full

[19] See James G. Stewart, *Corporate War Crimes: Prosecuting the Pillage of Natural Resources* (New York, Open Society Foundation, 2011), para. 69.

[20] See the report of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan entitled *Illegal economic and other activities in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan* (A/70/1016-S/2016/711, annex).

respect for the aforementioned principles, are necessary prerequisites for economic cooperation between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

In the outcome document of the United Nations summit for the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda, entitled "Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", the Heads of State and Government and High Representatives, meeting in New York in September 2015, stated that there could be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development. They reaffirmed that "every State has, and shall freely exercise, full permanent sovereignty over all its wealth, natural resources and economic activity" and that they "will implement the Agenda for the full benefit of all, for today's generation and for future generations". They also reaffirmed their commitment to international law and "the need to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of States" (see General Assembly resolution 70/1, preamble and paras. 18 and 38).

The sooner Armenia withdraws its armed forces from the Nagorno-Karabakh region and other occupied territories of Azerbaijan, the earlier the conflict will be resolved and both countries and their peoples will benefit from the prospects of cooperation and economic development, thus enabling them to implement successfully the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 35, 40, 70, 72 and 84, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yashar **Aliyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/72/509

General Assembly

Distr.: General
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Seventy-second session
Agenda item 31
Elimination of unilateral extraterritorial coercive economic measures as a means of political and economic compulsion

Letter dated 26 September 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to the ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, held on 20 September 2017, on the margins of the seventy-second session of the General Assembly.

In this regard, I am pleased to transmit herewith a copy of the Political Declaration of New York (see annex), which was unanimously adopted by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Movement at the ministerial meeting.

I should be grateful if you could circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 31.

(*Signed*) Rafael **Ramírez**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations

17-17583 (E) 161017

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 26 September 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Political Declaration of New York

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), gathered on 20 September 2017, in New York, on the margins of the High Level Segment of the 72 Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, undertook a review of the state of the international situation, particularly on the "Promulgation and Implementation of Unilateral Coercive Measures, in violation of International Law and the Human Rights of the Peoples subjected to them", and declared:

1. To reaffirm and underscore the Movement's abiding faith in and strong commitment to its founding principles, ideals and purposes, particularly in establishing a peaceful and prosperous world and a just and equitable world order as well as to the purposes and principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter.

2. To reaffirm the positions contained in its Final Document, as adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the Movement, during the XVII Summit of Island of Margarita.

3. To reaffirm the provisions of the Declaration of Havana on the Purposes and Principles and the Role of the Non-Aligned Movement in the Current International Juncture (2006), as well as of the Declaration of Island of Margarita (2016).

4. To reaffirm the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the principles and rules of international law, which are indispensable in preserving and promoting peace and security, the rule of law, economic development and social progress, and human rights for all. In this context, UN Member States, including those Member States of the Security Council, should renew their commitment to respect, defend, preserve and promote the UN Charter and international law, with the aim of making further progress to achieving full respect for international law.

5. To reaffirm their commitment to the promotion, protection, and fulfillment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, without discrimination, and to this end emphasize that all human rights: civil, cultural, economic, political and social are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated, and that they must be treated globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis; and also underline that the core values and principles of democracy, sustainable development and the respect of all human rights, including the right to development, are all closely related and mutually reinforcing.

6. To reaffirm their opposition to unilateralism and unilateral coercive measures imposed by certain States, including those of an economic, financial or trade nature not in accordance with international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the norms and principles governing peaceful relations among States, which can lead to the erosion and violation of the UN Charter, international law and human rights, the use and threat of use of force, and pressure and coercive measures as a means to achieving their national policy objectives, including those measures used as tools for political or economic and financial pressure against any country, in particular against developing countries. They further expressed their concern at the continued imposition of such measures which hinder the well-being of population of the affected countries and that create obstacles to the full realization of their human rights.

7. To reaffirm their commitment to initiate further vigorous transparent and inclusive initiatives to achieve the realization of multilateral cooperation in the areas of economic development and social progress, peace and security, and human rights for all and the rule of law, including through enhancing the Movement's unity, solidarity and cohesiveness on issues of collective concern and interests with the aim of shaping the multilateral agenda to embrace development as a fundamental priority, which should take into account the need for the developing and developed countries, and international institutions to intensify partnerships and coordinate their efforts and resources to effectively address all imbalances in the global agenda.

8. To reaffirm their commitment to the promotion, preservation and strengthening of multilateralism and the multilateral decision making process through the United Nations, by strictly adhering to its Charter and international law, with the aim of creating a just and equitable world order and global democratic governance.

9. To reaffirm that solidarity, the highest expression of respect, friendship and peace among States, is a broad concept encompassing the sustainability of international relations, the peaceful coexistence, and the transformative objectives of equity and empowerment of developing countries, whose ultimate goal is to achieve the full economic and social development of their peoples.

10. To reaffirm their determination to refrain from recognizing, adopting or implementing extraterritorial or unilateral coercive measures or laws, including unilateral economic sanctions, other intimidating measures, and arbitrary travel restrictions, that seek to exert pressure on Non-Aligned Countries — threatening their sovereignty and independence, and their freedom of trade and investment — and prevent them from exercising their right to decide, by their own free will, their own political, economic and social systems, where such measures or laws constitute flagrant violations of the UN Charter, international law, particularly the principles of non-intervention, self-determination and independence of States subjects to such practices, and the multilateral trading system, as well as the norms and principles governing friendly relations among States; and in this regard, oppose and condemn these measures or laws and their continued application, persevere with efforts to effectively reverse them and urge other States to do likewise, as called for by the General Assembly and other UN organs; request States applying these measures or laws to revoke them fully and immediately.

11. To reaffirm their strong condemnation to the unilateral application of economic and trade measures by one State against another that affect the free flow of international trade, which is not in accordance with international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the norms and principles governing peaceful relations among States. They called for the immediate elimination of such measures and urged States that have and continue to apply such laws and measures to fully comply with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and international law, which, inter alia, reaffirm the freedom of trade and navigation, and accordingly refrain from promulgating and application of such unilateral economic and trade measures against other States.

12. To reaffirm the objective of making the right to development a reality for everyone as set out in the UN Millennium Declaration, in the UN Declaration on the Right to Development and in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and give due consideration to the negative impact of unilateral economic and financial coercive measures on the realization of the right to development.

13. To reaffirm that food should not be used as an instrument for political and economic pressure. They reaffirmed the importance of international cooperation

and solidarity, as well as the necessity of refraining from undertaking unilateral coercive measures with general impact that endanger food security and are note in accordance with international law, including the general welfare and advancement of social development for communities in developing countries, with a view to mitigate the vulnerabilities particularly faced by women and children.

14. To reaffirm their determination that if any Member of the Movement suffers harm, whether this is economic, political or military in nature, or in terms of its security, as well as from the politicization of human rights, or if a Member suffers harm as a result of the imposition of unilateral sanctions or embargos that are not in accordance with international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the norms and principles governing peaceful relations among States, the Movement should express its solidarity with the affected country through the provision of political, moral, material and other forms of assistance.

15. To reaffirm and stress their principled positions concerning peaceful settlement of disputes, in accordance with international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the norms and principles governing peaceful relations among States, and on the non-use or threat of use of force, including through the promotion of political understanding and constructive dialogue among States, on the basis of mutual respect.

16. To reaffirm their opposition to all attempts of uniculturalism or the imposition of particular models of political, economic, social, legal or cultural systems, and promote dialogue among civilizations, culture of peace and inter-faith dialogue, which will contribute towards peace, security, stability, sustainable development and promotion of human rights.

17. To reaffirm their determination to continue opposing any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity or territorial integrity of a State, as well as their commitment for the respect of the sovereignty, the sovereign equality of States, the non-intervention in the internal affairs of States, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the abstention from the threat or use of force, in accordance with the UN Charter.

18. To reaffirm their determination to advance in the enhancement of the status and role of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as an anti-war peace-loving force, including through its instrumentalization as a Front for World Peace, and in favor, in particular, of the respect of the right to life and the inalienable right of the peoples to their self-determination and independence.

19. To take note of the adoption by the UN General Assembly on 22 June 2017 of resolution 71/292 requesting an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences of the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965 and encourage members to make written submissions in support of the completion of the decolonization of Mauritius to the Court within the prescribed time frame of 30 January 2018.

20. To reaffirm that terrorism should not be equated with the legitimate struggle of peoples under colonial or alien domination and foreign occupation for self-determination and national liberation. The brutalization of people remaining under foreign occupation should continue to be denounced as the gravest form of terrorism, and that the use of State power for the suppression and violence against peoples struggling against foreign occupation in exercising their inalienable right to self-determination should continue to be condemned. In this regard and in accordance with the UN Charter, international law and the relevant UN resolutions, the struggle of peoples under colonial or alien domination and foreign occupation

for self-determination and national liberation does not constitute terrorism (A/RES/46/51 of 9 December 1991).

21. To reaffirm that terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group, and that these attributions should not be used to justify terrorism or counter-terrorism measures that include, inter alia, profiling of terror suspects and intrusion on individual privacy.

22. To reaffirm their strong and unequivocal condemnation, as criminal, and reject terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, as well as all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever, by whomever, against whomsoever committed, including those in which States are directly or indirectly involved, which are unjustifiable whatever the considerations or factors that may be invoked to justify them, and in this context, reaffirm their support for the provisions contained in General Assembly resolution 46/51 of 9 December 1991 and other relevant UN resolutions.

23. To reaffirm the obligation of all States to ensure the security and safety of the members and premises of diplomatic and consular missions, as well as their inviolability, in accordance with international law, the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations as well as relevant UN General Assembly resolutions.

24. To reaffirm their commitment to taking all necessary measures to prevent the use of new platforms, including the internet, digital social networking and mass media, in spreading extremist religious thoughts and ideas, which eventually undermine the culture of peace and religious diversity.

25. To reaffirm the need for States to cooperate resolutely against international terrorism by taking speedy and effective measures to eliminate this scourge, and, in this regard, urge all States, in accordance with their obligations under applicable international law and the UN Charter, to deny safe haven and bring to justice or, where appropriate, extradite, on the basis of the principle of extradite or prosecute, the perpetrators of terrorist acts or any person who supports, facilitates or participates or attempts to participate in the financing, planning or preparation of terrorist acts.

26. To reaffirm their resolve to take speedy and effective measures to eliminate international terrorism, and in this context, urge all States, consistent with the UN Charter, to fulfill their obligations under international law and international humanitarian law combating terrorism, including by prosecuting or, where appropriate, extraditing the perpetrators of terrorist acts; by preventing the organization, instigation or financing of terrorist acts against other States from within or outside their territories or by organizations based in their territories; by refraining from organizing, instigating, assisting, financing or participating in terrorist acts in the territories of other States; by refraining from encouraging activities within their territories directed towards the commission of such acts; by refraining from allowing the use of their territories for planning, training or financing for such acts; or by refraining from supplying arms or other weapons that could be used for terrorist acts in other States.

New York, 20 September 2017

United Nations A/72/510

General Assembly

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Seventy-second session
Agenda item 122
Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council

Letter dated 2 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour of writing to you on behalf of the L-69, a diverse group of countries, made up largely of small States in Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia and the Pacific, who are united by a common cause: to achieve lasting and comprehensive reform of the United Nations Security Council.

During the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform at the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, the L-69 Group presented the full particulars of our assertions that 183 Member States had participated in the intergovernmental negotiations or in the Assembly debate on the topic of Security Council reform, and that, since 2009, 164 Member States had called for a text to serve as the basis of negotiations (see annexes I and II).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annexes as an official document of the General Assembly under agenda item 122 on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Inga Rhonda **King**
Permanent Representative

17-17668 (E) 181017

Please recycle

Annex I to the letter dated 2 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General[1]

List of Member States that have participated in the intergovernmental negotiations, or have made statements on the record, on the topic of Security Council reform in the General Assembly, since the beginning of the intergovernmental negotiations, in 2009

On the basis of the statements made in the General Assembly, the intergovernmental negotiations and contributions to the framework document and its annex, we assert that 183 Member States have actively participated in the intergovernmental negotiations process since it commenced.

We have identified statements on Security Council reform (since the beginning of the intergovernmental negotiations process in 2009) for all Member States except the following 10 Member States: Albania, Andorra, Azerbaijan, Honduras, Kyrgyzstan, Israel, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

It is important to note that 7 of these 10 Member States did, in fact, participate in the intergovernmental negotiations process, albeit not through statements that can be found, but rather by signing the letter sent to the ambassador of Afghanistan, Zahir Tanin, then the chair of intergovernmental negotiations, in 2009. In that letter, the Member States requested him to present "a text with options to serve as a basis for negotiations". These seven Member States are Andorra, Honduras, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. This leaves only three Member States for which no record of participation has yet been found: Albania, Azerbaijan and Israel.

If these seven Member States were to be taken into account, the number of countries that have engaged in the process since the commencement of the intergovernmental negotiations would actually be 190.

The complete list of 183 countries, along with details of their statements in the General Assembly plenary, intergovernmental negotiation meetings and contributions to the framework document, follows (see appendix).

[1] The present annex is intended to be illustrative and does not provide an exhaustive list of statements by Member States in the General Assembly or in the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform.

Appendix

List of 183 countries with details regarding their statements in the General Assembly plenary and intergovernmental negotiation meetings, along with contributions to the framework document

Country	*Date of statements or contributions to framework document*
Afghanistan	Intergovernmental negotiations: April 2017.
Algeria	General Assembly: November 2011 and November 2014.
	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: April 2017.
Angola	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Antigua and Barbuda	General Assembly (CARICOM): November 2011, November 2014 and October 2015.
Argentina	General Assembly: November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2014 and November 2016.
	General Assembly (Uniting for Consensus Group): November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.
Armenia	Intergovernmental negotiations: March 2009.
Australia	General Assembly: November 2010, November 2011, November 2012 and November 2016.
Austria	Intergovernmental negotiations: April 2014.
Bahamas	General Assembly (CARICOM): November 2011, November 2014 and October 2015.
Bahrain	General Assembly: November 2010.
	General Assembly (Arab Group): November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Bangladesh	General Assembly: November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.
Barbados	General Assembly (CARICOM): November 2011, November 2014 and October 2015.
	Intergovernmental negotiations (CARICOM): April 2017.
Belarus	General Assembly: November 2010, November 2011 and November 2012.

Country	*Date of statements or contributions to framework document*
Belgium	General Assembly: November 2010 and October 2015.
	General Assembly (Belgium and Netherlands): November 2011, November 2012 and November 2014.
	General Assembly (Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg): November 2016.
Belize	General Assembly (CARICOM): November 2011, November 2014 and October 2015.
Benin	General Assembly: November 2014.
	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: May 2017.
Bhutan	General Assembly: November 2011, November 2012, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	Intergovernmental negotiations: April 2017.
Bosnia and Herzegovina	General Assembly: November 2013.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: 11 April 2014.
Botswana	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Brazil	General Assembly: November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, October 2015 and November 2016.
	General Assembly (G-4): November 2014.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.
Brunei Darussalam	Framework document.
Bulgaria	Intergovernmental negotiations: May 2012.
Burkina Faso	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Burundi	General Assembly: November 2014.
	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February and March 2017.
Cabo Verde	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.

Country	*Date of statements or contributions to framework document*
Cambodia	General Assembly: November 2014.
Cameroon	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Canada	General Assembly: November 2010, November 2011 and November 2016.
	General Assembly (Uniting for Consensus Group): November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: March 2017.
Central African Republic	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Chad	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Chile	General Assembly: November 2011, November 2012, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: April and May 2017.
China	General Assembly: November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.
Colombia	General Assembly: November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	General Assembly (Uniting for Consensus Group): November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.
Comoros	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Congo	General Assembly: November 2012, November 2014 and November 2016.
	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: April 2017.
Costa Rica	General Assembly: November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2014 and October 2015.
	General Assembly (Uniting for Consensus Group): November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.

Country	*Date of statements or contributions to framework document*
Côte d'Ivoire	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Croatia	General Assembly: October 2015.
Cuba	General Assembly: November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: March, April and May 2017.
Cyprus	General Assembly: November 2013.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: May 2014, February 2015 (statement at preliminary meeting) and May 2017.
Czech Republic	Framework document.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February 2017.
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	General Assembly: November 2012, October 2015 and November 2016.
Democratic Republic of the Congo	General Assembly: November 2012 and November 2014.
	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Denmark	General Assembly (Nordic Group): October 2015 and November 2016.
Djibouti	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Dominica	General Assembly (CARICOM): November 2011, November 2013, November 2014 and October 2015.
Dominican Republic	General Assembly: November 2010 and November 2011.
Ecuador	General Assembly: October 2015 and November 2016.
Egypt	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.
El Salvador	General Assembly: November 2012.
Equatorial Guinea	General Assembly: November 2011.
	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Eritrea	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.

Country	*Date of statements or contributions to framework document*
Estonia	Framework document.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February and March 2017.
Ethiopia	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Fiji	General Assembly (Pacific Small Island Developing States): November 2010.
Finland	General Assembly (Nordic Group): October 2015 and November 2016.
France	General Assembly: November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.
Gabon	General Assembly: November 2016.
	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Gambia	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Georgia	General Assembly: November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March and May 2017.
Germany	General Assembly: November 2014.
	General Assembly (G-4): October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: March, April and May 2017.
Ghana	General Assembly: November 2010.
	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Greece	Intergovernmental negotiations: 11 February 2015.
Grenada	General Assembly (CARICOM): November 2011, November 2013, November 2014 and October 2015.
Guatemala	General Assembly: October 2015.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: March 2017.
Guinea	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Guinea-Bissau	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.

Country	*Date of statements or contributions to framework document*
Guyana	General Assembly (CARICOM): November 2011, November 2013, November 2014 and October 2015.
	Intergovernmental negotiations (CARICOM): February, March, April and May 2017.
Haiti	General Assembly (CARICOM): November 2011, November 2013, November 2014 and October 2015.
Hungary	General Assembly: November 2011, November 2013 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.
Iceland	General Assembly: (Nordic Group): October 2015 and November 2016.
India	General Assembly: November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.
Indonesia	General Assembly: November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	General Assembly: November 2011 and October 2015.
Iraq	General Assembly (Arab Group): November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Ireland	General Assembly: November 2013.
	Framework document.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March and May 2017.
Italy	General Assembly: November 2011.
	General Assembly (Uniting for Consensus Group): November 2012, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations (Uniting for Consensus Group): February, March, April and May 2017.
Jamaica	General Assembly (CARICOM): November 2011, November 2013, November 2014 and October 2015.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: April and May 2017.
Japan	General Assembly: November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March and May 2017.
Jordan	General Assembly (Arab Group): November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Kazakhstan	General Assembly: November 2010, November 2011, November 2012 and October 2015.

Country	*Date of statements or contributions to framework document*
Kenya	General Assembly: October 2015 and November 2016.
	General Assembly (Africa Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March and April 2017.
Kiribati	General Assembly (Pacific Small Island Developing States): November 2013.
Kuwait	General Assembly: November 2010, November 2011 and November 2012.
	General Assembly (Arab Group): November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations (Arab Group): February, April and May 2017.
Lao People's Democratic Republic	Framework document.
Latvia	General Assembly: November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February 2017.
Lebanon	General Assembly (Arab Group): November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Lesotho	General Assembly: November 2010 and November 2012.
Liberia	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Libya	General Assembly: November 2010, November 2011, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Liechtenstein	General Assembly: November 2012, November 2014 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.
Lithuania	Framework document.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February 2017.
Luxembourg	General Assembly (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg): November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, April and May 2017.
Madagascar	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.

Country	Date of statements or contributions to framework document
Malawi	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Malaysia	General Assembly: November 2011, November 2012, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Maldives	General Assembly: November 2012, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Mali	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Malta	General Assembly: November 2011, November 2012 and November 2016.
	General Assembly (Uniting for Consensus Group): November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.
Marshall Islands	General Assembly (Pacific Small Island Developing States): November 2013.
Mauritania	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Mauritius	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: April 2017.
Mexico	General Assembly: November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	General Assembly (Uniting for Consensus Group): November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.
Micronesia (Federated States of)	General Assembly (Pacific Small Island Developing States): November 2010 and November 2013.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: March and April 2017.
Monaco	Framework document.
Mongolia	General Assembly: November 2010, November 2011, November 2012 and November 2013.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: March and April 2017.
Montenegro	General Assembly: November 2012.

Country	*Date of statements or contributions to framework document*
Morocco	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: March and May 2017.
Mozambique	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Myanmar	Framework document.
Namibia	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: April 2017.
Nauru	General Assembly (Pacific Small Island Developing States): November 2010.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: April 2017.
Nepal	General Assembly: November 2014.
Netherlands	General Assembly: November 2010.
	General Assembly (Netherlands and Belgium): November 2011, November 2012, November 2014 and November 2016.
New Zealand	General Assembly: November 2011 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: March, April and May 2017.
Nicaragua	General Assembly: November 2011, November 2012, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.
Niger	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Nigeria	General Assembly: November 2011, November 2014 and October 2015.
	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.
Norway	General Assembly (Nordic Group): October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations (Nordic Group): February 2017.
Oman	General Assembly (Arab Group): November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.

Country	*Date of statements or contributions to framework document*
Pakistan	General Assembly: November 2011, November 2012, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	General Assembly (Uniting for Consensus Group): November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.
Palau	General Assembly (Pacific Small Island Developing States): November 2010.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February 2016.
Panama	General Assembly: October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.
Papua New Guinea	General Assembly (Pacific Small Island Developing States): November 2010 and November 2014.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: April 2017.
Paraguay	Intergovernmental negotiations: February 2016.
Peru	General Assembly: November 2011, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March and May 2017.
Philippines	General Assembly: November 2010 and November 2011.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: March 2017.
Poland	General Assembly: October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.
Portugal	Intergovernmental negotiations: April 2009.
	General Assembly: November 2013
Qatar	General Assembly (Arab Group): November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: March and April 2017.
Republic of Korea	General Assembly: November 2011, November 2012, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	General Assembly (Uniting for Consensus Group): November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.
Republic of Moldova	Intergovernmental negotiations: March 2017.
Romania	General Assembly: November 2010 and October 2015.
Russian Federation	General Assembly: November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.

Country	*Date of statements or contributions to framework document*
Rwanda	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Saint Kitts and Nevis	General Assembly (CARICOM): November 2011, November 2013, November 2014 and October 2015.
Saint Lucia	General Assembly (CARICOM): November 2011, November 2013, November 2014 and October 2015.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: March 2017.
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	General Assembly (CARICOM): November 2011, November 2013, November 2014 and October 2015.
	Intergovernmental negotiations (on behalf of L-69): February, March, April and May 2017.
Samoa	General Assembly (Pacific Small Island Developing States): November 2010.
San Marino	General Assembly: November 2011, October 2015 and November 2016.
	General Assembly (Uniting for Consensus Group): November 2014, October 2015, November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March and April 2017.
Sao Tome and Principe	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Saudi Arabia	General Assembly (Arab Group): November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Senegal	General Assembly: November 2011.
	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Serbia	Framework document.
Seychelles	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Sierra Leone	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations (African Group): February, March, April and May 2017.
Singapore	General Assembly: November 2013 and November 2016.
	General Assembly (S-5): November 2011.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.
Slovakia	General Assembly: November 2016.

Country	*Date of statements or contributions to framework document*
Slovenia	General Assembly: November 2011 and November 2013.
Solomon Islands	General Assembly: November 2011 and November 2014.
	General Assembly (Pacific Small Island Developing States): November 2010.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: April 2017.
Somalia	General Assembly: October 2015.
	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
South Africa	General Assembly: November 2010, November 2012, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: March, April and May 2017.
South Sudan	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Spain	General Assembly: November 2010, November 2011, November 2012 and November 2014.
	General Assembly (Uniting for Consensus Group): November 2014, October 2015, November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.
Sri Lanka	Intergovernmental negotiations: 11 February 2015.
Sudan	General Assembly: November 2011.
	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Suriname	General Assembly: September and October 2015.
	General Assembly (CARICOM): November 2011, November 2013, November 2014 and October 2015.
Swaziland	General Assembly: November 2010.
	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Sweden	General Assembly (Nordic Group): October 2015 and November 2016.
Switzerland	General Assembly: November 2012, October 2015 and November 2016.
	General Assembly (S-5): November 2010 and November 2011.

Country	*Date of statements or contributions to framework document*
Syrian Arab Republic	General Assembly: November 2016.
	General Assembly (Arab Group): November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Thailand	General Assembly: November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: May 2017.
Timor-Leste	Framework document.
Togo	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Tonga	General Assembly (Pacific Small Island Developing States): November 2010.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February 2017.
Trinidad and Tobago	General Assembly (CARICOM): November 2011, November 2013, November 2014 and October 2015.
Tunisia	General Assembly: November 2011, November 2012, November 2014 and November 2016.
	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Turkey	General Assembly: November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, October 2015 and November 2016.
	General Assembly (Uniting for Consensus Group): November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.
Tuvalu	General Assembly (Pacific Small Island Developing States): November 2010.
Uganda	General Assembly: October 2015.
	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Ukraine	General Assembly: November 2010, November 2011, November 2012 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March and April 2017.
United Arab Emirates	General Assembly (Arab Group): November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	General Assembly: November 2010, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.

Country	*Date of statements or contributions to framework document*
United Republic of Tanzania	General Assembly: November 2012.
	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: May 2017.
United States of America	General Assembly: November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February, March, April and May 2017.
Uruguay	General Assembly: November 2016.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: March, April and May 2017.
Vanuatu	General Assembly (Pacific Small Island Developing States): November 2010.
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	General Assembly: November 2010, November 2011, November 2012 and October 2015.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February and March 2017.
Viet Nam	General Assembly: November 2014 and October 2015.
	Intergovernmental negotiations: February and April 2017.
Yemen	General Assembly (Arab Group): November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Zambia	General Assembly: November 2011, October 2015.
	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.
Zimbabwe	General Assembly: November 2011.
	General Assembly (African Group): November 2010, November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, November 2014, October 2015 and November 2016.

Abbreviations: CARICOM, Caribbean Community; G-4, Group of Four; S-5, Small Five Group.

Annex II to the letter dated 2 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Number of Member States that have called for a text to serve as the basis of negotiations since the beginning of intergovernmental negotiations, in 2009

By our calculation, 164 countries are in favour of a text as the basis for negotiations.

On 23 December 2009, 138 countries wrote to the chair of the intergovernmental negotiations requesting a text with options to serve as a basis for negotiations.

It is a matter of record that the African Group, through the African Union Committee of Ten Heads of State and Government (C-10), has called for text-based negotiations. Therefore, we have added the following 20 countries from the African Group, which are not reflected in the 138 that signed the letter, to the number of Member States that have called for text-based negotiations, thereby bring bringing the number to 158: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Republic of the Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone and South Sudan.

In addition, and as a matter of record, Kiribati as a Pacific small island developing State and the Netherlands as a member of Benelux, as well as Afghanistan, New Zealand, Panama and Sweden, are known to be in support of text-based negotiations and are also not included in the letter of 23 December 2009.

Thus, one can safely assert that a total of 164 Member States are in favour of commencing text-based negotiations.